Justice William O. Douglas, in his dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, said “Contemporary public concern for protecting nature’s ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preservation.” His opinion goes on to state that corporations are given personhood and so should natural systems. In the absence of a voice, my friend and colleague Craig Allen likes to say that our job as ecologists is to tell the story of natural systems. We do this by asking questions, measuring things to answer those questions, interpreting the results, and writing it up to share with people. Today I want to give voice to the Teakettle Experimental Forest, a place that burned in the first few days of September 2025.

I have been working at the Teakettle Experimental Forest since 2002. I did part of my dissertation research here, including a tree-ring climate reconstruction and an experiment to understand how climate change, nitrogen deposition, and fire would impact understory plant diversity. I have great attachment to this place. I spent months every year camped-out to collect data.

I skied into the site during the winter and shoveled snow to manipulate snowpack for my understory plant experiment, spending a week at a time in the snow. I wish I had some photos to post, but these were the days of film cameras and I was always bad about taking photos. I also worked tirelessly with my collaborators, whom are also friends, to maintain the built infrastructure at the site that is property of the USFS so that it didn’t crumble and we still had a place to work from.

I watched as what I like to call the Teakettle skyline (the really big trees) changed because of the 2012-2016 drought, which killed approximately 30% of the trees. Most of the mortality happened in the largest trees, which was heartbreaking because I love to hang out with big trees and in big mountains.

Needless to say, I have significant attachment to this place.

We have known for a long time that this forest, like many across the western US, faced substantial risk from climate change, insects, and wildfire. As we worked to understand the effects of management activities on forest process at Teakettle, all of us scientists worked to make sure that knowledge was not locked up in the scientific literature, that it was made available to forest managers and stakeholders. You can see the results of this work in documents meant to synthesize the science and inform management. I have participated in field trips for the Dinkey Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Project (CFLRP). I have responded to numerous requests for information from stakeholders in this area. And, I was on the federal advisory committee when the Dinkey CFLRP was up for review and made the argument that the project was worth additional investment (more on that shortly). Needless to say, I, along with many colleagues at Teakettle, have worked damn hard to make sure the research we did was accessible and useful for informing management decision-making. 

In 2005 a small fire started downslope of Teakettle. Harold Zald, a friend and collaborator at Teakettle, and I were asked to evacuate the site. We pulled equipment, grabbed documents and data sheets, and loaded everything we could in our trucks and pulled out of there wondering if this would be it. Had the site burned then, before the drought-caused mortality, it may have been better for the forest.

In 2015, the Rough Fire, burning from the south, threatened Teakettle. We did not have anyone working at the site that year. The two cabins we use for cooking/bathroom and office space were wrapped as firefighters prepared for potential fire growth. Fortunately, they were able to hold the fire and Teakettle escaped.

In 2017, with the support of a CALFIRE research grant, we implemented a second prescribed burn on the original Teakettle experiment in collaboration with managers on the High Sierra Ranger District. Adam Hernandez, a wonderful fire manager with a can-do attitude, threw his support behind the project because he knew the value of the work we were doing, and he ensured our experimental burns were implemented.
Even as we were planning this burn, we knew that we needed information at a larger scale. We were working in research plots that are 10 acres in size and it is difficult to study a process like fire at that scale because it commonly burns over a much larger area. So we got to work.

In 2019 we applied for another CALFIRE research grant and were awarded funding to burn the majority of Teakettle. We wanted to understand how reintroducing fire into a fire-dependent forest that hadn’t seen fire since 1865 was going to influence tree mortality, smoke production, and alter carbon storage. Of course, the dysfunction in Washington, DC meant the government was shutdown while we were writing this proposal, making it impossible to consult with Sierra National Forest leadership while writing our proposal. Once funded, we immediately reached out and the idea was warmly received and we were told by the District Ranger on the High Sierra Ranger District that the Teakettle burn was being added to their work plan. Of course, it was now 2020 and everything was in chaos. As we all grappled with the global pandemic, we tried to continue planning for the burn.

Then, the Creek Fire started on September 4, 2020. Like many other people, I was working from home. I would anxiously await the next satellite overpass so I could see what the fire was doing. For some time, we thought Teakettle was at risk. Fortunately, Teakettle was spared, but the Creek Fire showed us exactly what happens when drought, insects, and fire all join forces in this climate changed world. The fuel load from dead trees was huge and we estimated the influence of high temperature on the availability of those big dead trees to burn. High temperatures made much more fuel available and, as a result, our operational fire spread models could not predict the spread of the fire. The same fuel problem in the Creek Fire existed at Teakettle and this was in the front of my mind when I drove into the Creek Fire footprint on my way to Teakettle during spring 2021.

When I entered the fire footprint near Tollhouse, I was amazed at how far down the fire had burned. As I crested the top of the climb out of the valley where I used to drive into a wall of green and got my first look at the widespread impacts of the fire, I cried.

I’m not prone to much emotion, let alone emotional display. This one hit hard and I knew Teakettle could easily face a similar fate. Us researchers at Teakettle, Malcolm North, Harold Zald, Marc Meyer, Brandon Collins, decided that while the research we proposed was important, the most important aspect of our project was to burn Teakettle in a prescribed fire so we could reduce the fuels and decrease the chance that any wildfire would kill the remaining trees.

Unfortunately, the same fire that drove us to ensure Teakettle got burned under our terms caused the Sierra National Forest to go into emergency recovery mode and neglect projects on ‘green’ forest in favor of working to reforest the ‘black’ forest and the Teakettle burn became something to push off. We began to face resistance from the High Sierra Ranger District about Teakettle burn planning. Every time they brought up a limitation and we provided a solution, they presented another limitation.

In hindsight, I should have expected this. The Dinkey CFLRP proposal that the forest had submitted 10-years prior included thinning and prescribed burning important tracts of forest land in the project area to protect communities, infrastructure, and habitat for several wildlife species. Some of the thinning was completed over the 10-years, but little of the prescribed burning. The renewal application that we reviewed on the federal advisory committee identified all of the challenges – drought and insects causing tree mortality, fire recovery, etc – and a plan to get back on track with the treatments. I made the argument to the committee that these were real challenges and that the forest had been dealt a bad hand. What I’m now confident of is that the forest was dealt a bad hand when leadership was selected. Real leaders recognize when they are facing a pressing challenge and rise to the occasion with a sense of urgency. They don’t make excuses.

Over the past several years, we have continued to work to get Teakettle burned in a prescribed fire. Malcolm North wrote a CALFIRE forest health proposal to pay for the burn and it was funded and is being administered by the Climate Wildfire Institute. The last real remaining constraint – a lack of financial resources – had been removed and the leadership on the forest would state their support of the project while digging in their heels to slow progress. Finally, it looked like the dam of resistance was breaking. There was lots of work underway this summer and we were hoping that by fall 2026 we would have the weather window necessary to conduct the burn. Enter the Garnet Fire.

Most of Teakettle burned on September 1 (all maps from CA IMT 10).

Here is the fire perimeter as of September 2, with Teakettle delineated with the dashed line.

Given the fuel loads, the behavior described in the daily reports and the amount of area that burned on September 1, we expect that much of the burn area will be high-severity. Marc Meyer had been leading an effort to remove the pine needles and branches from the base of the big sugar and Jeffrey pines to try and decrease the number that died during the prescribed burn. We can only hope that this spared some of them when the fire ripped through the majority of Teakettle.

I cried again on September 1. I am sad and angry. I am sad because this old-growth forest is no more. I am angry because this outcome was a choice. The choice was inaction by forest ‘leadership’. They chose doing nothing instead of working to prepare these incredible trees that are hundreds of years old and some as much as 9 feet in diameter. The unfortunate circumstance we are in is that this agency has selected for individuals who will not rock the boat. People who do not take risks are rewarded and promoted. Those that do take risks are only rewarded and promoted if they are successful and even then… This is professional malpractice. When OUR national forests are facing multiple risks, when OUR national forests are turning into national shrublands and grasslands because of insects, fire and climate change, we need forest leadership that understands the urgency of the situation. These are OUR forests and the people responsible for leading the managers of these forests need to create the conditions where forest and fire managers are supported in making hard decisions and acting based on data. There are many fantastic land managers, but we need the US Forest Service to appoint leadership at the forest level that understands the urgency and supports their people to make difficult decisions and take risks. Some forests are already run by this type of leader, but they are rare. Our public lands are one of the crown jewels of our country and I hope that we can act with enough urgency to help prepare them for the changes that are coming.

I leave you with some images of the forest that was Teakettle before the Garnet Fire.

The Earth Systems Ecology Lab (www.hurteaulab.org) at the University of New Mexico is recruiting a postdoctoral researcher with a strong background in ecosystem modeling or spatial data analysis to contribute to a project aimed at improving our ability to model smoke impacts on photovoltaic energy production in the western US. This project will include parameterizing the LANDIS-II model for a new location and running simulations to quantify the influence of changing climate and wildfire on biomass accumulation and consumption. The project will also work to refine partitioning of NPP into different fuel categories to better crosswalk output with the WRF model. The project is in collaboration with researchers at Sandia National Lab and the National Center for Atmospheric Research. The researcher will work as part of an interdisciplinary collaborative team.  

The initial timeframe is a two-year project. The initial appointment is for one year (beginning summer/fall 2023), with the possibility of extension.  Salary is $62,000-68,000 per year, plus benefits.  Required qualifications include a PhD in ecology, ecosystem science, earth/environmental sciences, or statistics and programming experience with R.  Preferred qualifications include programming in C+ or C# and willingness to occasionally participate in field sampling. The preferred start is January 2024.

Applicants should submit a cover letter detailing research interests and goals, a complete CV, and names and contact information for three references in a single pdf to Matthew Hurteau ([email protected]).  Review of applications will begin on 30 OCT 2023.

The University of New Mexico is committed to hiring and retaining a diverse workforce.  We are an Equal Opportunity Employer, making decisions without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, age, veteran status, disability, or any other protected class.

This post follows a more general post about managed fire, which you can read here.

One of the best parts about my job is that I have a backstage pass to the natural world. As my friend and colleague Craig Allen likes to say, as scientists “we are interpreters for the natural world”. On 6 July I got to tour the Comanche Fire on the El Rito ranger district of the Carson National Forest with District Ranger Angie Krall and a number of staff members from the Carson. It is still an active fire, so we got briefed by the Incident Commander on operations and we got an overview of the decision-making around this ignition and their choice not to immediately suppress the fire. The people on the field tour included researchers, non-Forest Service collaborators working in the area, and a couple of members of the press.

What follows is my summary of the information. Since I was typing this on my phone and my thumbs are large and I’m at the age where I need cheaters to read, anything (dates, acres, etc) that is incorrect is because I either didn’t hear it correctly or wrote it down incorrectly. These dates and numbers may be important to some, but what is important about managed fire is the decision-making process and the outcome. Those are where I focused my attention.

​The Comanche Fire started as a lightening ignition on 8 June. Here is a photo of the ignition site.

The ignition site is in complex terrain, which is fire manager speak for rugged country (e.g. cliffs, canyons, peaks, etc) that is dangerous for firefighters. Federal fire policy allows managers to make a choice when an ignition is ‘natural’ (e.g. lightning). They can either suppress the fire or they can manage the fire for resource benefit. Keep in mind, this is not a binary decision. Sometimes managers may choose to manage for resource benefit on one side of the fire and work to suppress it on the other side. It really depends on objectives and risks.

​Below is an operations map that I’ll use to described the decision-making that went into the Comanche Fire.

To orient you, the line around the outside of the areas marked Division A and W the red area and the purple area is the area that managers evaluated for burning. This is what fire managers call drawing the box. The first decision point has to do with firefighter and community safety. In this case, there were no communities threatened, but as I mentioned this is rough country and risks to people working the fire go WAY UP when in ‘complex terrain’. The next decision point has to do with weather and moisture in the vegetation, forest conditions, and the position relative to previous fires and management activities. The wet spring and mild weather conditions meant that fire would burn at lower intensity and be beneficial for the forest. Downwind of the ignition point are previous wildfire burn areas and prescribed fire areas with less vegetation to burn. These are places that fire crews can use to contain the fire. As a result of these factors, the managers decided they could draw a bigger box to decrease the safety hazards for fire crews.
But how big is the box? Those previous prescribed fires and wildfires and the topography help determine what the fire crews have to work with for containing the fire. The managers then work with resource managers (archaeologists, wildlife biologists, and many others) to evaluate if and what could be impacted by fire. These pieces of information help them determine the size of the area (the box) that they will consider allowing fire to burn if the effects of the fire are going to be beneficial for the forest. In the case of the Comanche Fire that box is approximately 10,000 acres (the black outline).

Now that the box is drawn, what comes next is the plan to manage the fire. There are two common misunderstandings about this process. The first is that fire crews sit back and wait. That would be crazy because if the weather changes or something else happens and the fire spread increases dramatically, that increases the chance it gets out of its box. To keep it in the box, they use those landscape features like ridges and road to start working with the fire by burning from these features to control how quickly the fire can spread. This is the second common misunderstanding. When fire crews light by hand or with helicopters or drones, this does not make it a prescribed fire. The same thing happens when they are suppressing a wildfire; they are trying to reduce fuel in areas they plan to use for containment.
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The red areas on the map are the areas that actually burned in the Comanche Fire and along the perimeter and in the interior are the places where fire crews lit fire to manage the how quickly the fire spread and the effects it had on the forest. This includes creating fire line around springs and burning from that fire line to protect the area.

​We hiked up a ridge line to get a landscape perspective of the fire. In this photo you can see a patch of oak that is the result of some tree torching during a prescribed burn in the early 2000s. You can also see a small patch of tree torching from the Comanche Fire. These are not ‘bad’ outcomes because they are small. These forests were much more patchy two hundred years ago and will be better able to tolerate ongoing climate change and more fire if we restore that patchiness. The other thing you should notice is how much green forest is still in that fire footprint.

Managing fires and changing tactics
Later in June weather conditions began to change. Temperatures increased and that caused the vegetation to begin drying out. By itself, lower fuel moisture is not a big deal, but a wind event was forecast. By 20 June, managers decided that they because of wind and drying conditions they were not getting the beneficial fire effects that were the objective and that weather conditions were increasing the risk to fire crews and the public. At that point they called in aerial retardant drops along the southern boundary to stop the fire spread. This decision point was misinterpreted by some as the fire crews having ‘lost’ the burn. The red polygon is still well within the perimeter designated by managers as appropriate for this fire event. Nothing was lost. A change in decision was made in response to changing conditions.

​At the time of our briefing, total burn area was 1974 acres (red polygon) and approximately 20% of the area covered by the red polygon was unburned. These 1974 acres of forest are in better ecological condition than they would have been in the absence of the Comanche Fire. This is the type of fire we need to encourage in our southwestern forests because it is ecologically appropriate and it is an important part of decreasing the risk of high-severity wildfire to communities and watersheds. The easy decision in fire management is to suppress an ignition. No matter what happens, if fire managers tried to put it out, they are treated as heroes. The much harder decision is to choose taking advantage of conditions to achieve outcomes like that of the Comanche Fire. There are more risks, but also much better forest management outcomes.